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Abstract 
 
The Cognitive Interview is among the most widely accepted forms of police 
interviewing techniques; however it is ineffective for witnesses with Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD). One of its main components involves mentally reinstating the internal and 
external context that was experienced at encoding. We report evidence showing that it is the 
mental reinstatement instructions in the absence of any physical cues that individuals with 
ASD find difficult. In more supported conditions where they physically return to the same 
environment in which they learnt the material, they recall as much as their typical 
counterparts. Our findings indicate that recall in ASD is aided by context, but only when 
supported by the physical environment. These findings have important implications for 
investigative interviewing procedures for witnesses with ASD. 
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Context reinstatement effects on eyewitness memory in autism spectrum disorder 
 
Police interviewing techniques in the UK and USA have improved substantially in the 
past 25 years. The Cognitive Interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Geiselman, Fisher, 
Firstenberg, Hutton, Sullivan, et al., 1984) is an evidence-based technique which is now 
taught to police interviewers as part of their specialist interviewing training to elicit more 
details from witnesses but without compromising their accuracy (Home Office, 2007). The 
Cognitive Interview is based on two basic memory principles: First, that recall will be 
enhanced if the context that is experienced at retrieval matches that experienced at 
encoding (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). This is achieved by ‘context reinstatement’ - 
encouraging the witness to mentally relive both the internal (subjective thoughts and feelings 
etc) and external (physical and environmental) contextual details that they experienced prior 
to and during the witnessed event, before going on to freely recall everything that they can 
from the event, even seemingly trivial or partial details. The second principle is that 
memories are stored as a series of interconnected nodes, so a single memory can be 
accessed in a number of different ways (Anderson & Pichert 1978). This is done by asking 
the witness to recall the events in a different order or from a different perspective (but see 
Boon & Noon, 1994).  
A number of studies have demonstrated that the Cognitive Interview is effective in 
increasing the amount of correct details reported without a concomitant increase in incorrect 
details with a number of different groups, including adult witnesses (see Memon, Meissner & 
Fraser, 2010), children (e.g. Geiselman & Padilla, 1988), older witnesses (e.g. Wright & 
Holliday, 2007) and witnesses with intellectual disabilities (e.g. Milne, Clare & Bull, 1999). In 
the only study to date to examine the Cognitive Interview with witnesses with autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD) however, it not only failed to increase the amount of correct details 
that they reported, it also significantly reduced their accuracy (Maras & Bowler, 2010).  
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ASD encompasses a range of pervasive developmental disorders including Autistic 
Disorder, Asperger’s Disorder, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise 
Specified, all of which are clinically defined by abnormalities in the domains of 
communication and socio-emotional behaviour, and the presence of narrow, stereotyped 
and repetitive patterns of behaviour and interests (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
It has been argued that deficits in reciprocal social behaviour are at the core of ASD (e.g. 
Constantino & Todd, 2003; Mundy, Sigman & Kasari, 1994; Kanner, 1943). It is not 
surprising therefore, that when Maras & Bowler (2010) broke each detail that participants 
recalled down in terms of whether it pertained to a person, action, surrounding, or object, the 
ASD group recalled significantly fewer person and action details, but did not differ from their 
typical comparisons on the number of surrounding or object details that they recalled. 
However social deficits are not the only features of ASD; individuals with ASD also present 
with a rather unique cognitive profile, including very specific memory difficulties. Whilst they 
tend to demonstrate intact or even enhanced abilities in some domains such as rote memory 
(e.g. Kanner, 1943; Mottron, Belleville, Stip, & Morasse, 1998), they show impairments in 
other areas including the ability to spontaneously exploit the semantic relations between 
items to aid their recall (e.g. Gaigg, Gardiner & Bowler, 2008; Hermelin & O’Connor, 1967; 
Tager-Flusberg, 1991) and in recalling personally experienced events (e.g. Crane & 
Goddard, 2008; Klein, Chan & Loftus, 1999; Lind & Bowler, 2010).  
Indeed, several converging lines of evidence suggest that individuals with ASD would 
have great difficulty with the context reinstatement component of the Cognitive Interview, 
which might explain why Maras and Bowler (2010) found this interview to be so ineffective 
for witnesses with ASD. First, they have diminished memory for source or incidentally 
encoded context, particularly in unsupported conditions where the context has to be recalled 
rather than recognised (Bowler, Gardiner & Berthollier, 2004; Bowler, Gaigg & Gardiner, 
2008). In the aging literature difficulties with monitoring the source of memories have been 
linked to problems in the kinds of processes that context reinstatement requires, namely in 
binding features of source (i.e. context) -relevant information together with the to-be-
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remembered details in the first place at encoding (e.g. Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996), and then 
later spontaneously considering these context details at retrieval (e.g. Henkel, Johnson & 
DeLeonardis, 1998). If individuals with ASD do not encode the event with its context or if 
they have difficulty in later recalling the context, then it is unsurprising that the context 
reinstatement procedure of the Cognitive Interview is ineffective.  
Second, on tests of recognition individuals with ASD tend to rely more heavily on 
feelings of familiarity (e.g. ‘know’ responses) and report fewer instances of consciously 
recollecting vivid contextual details that were associated with the item at encoding (e.g. 
‘remember’ responses). Tulving (1985) argues that ‘remembering’ involves mental time 
travel to re-create the spatio-temporal context of the recollected episode. This is exactly the 
process that is required by context reinstatement, and individuals with ASD are known to 
have difficulties with this (e.g. Lind & Bowler, 2010).  
Third, individuals with ASD perform well on tasks that rely on item-specific 
processing, which focus on individual items of information without any reference to relations 
among them, and poorly on relational processing tasks (Gaigg et al., 2008). Context 
reinstatement is based on the exploitation of the relations between context and event details 
to trigger more details from memory. If individuals with ASD witness a crime and process the 
event details in isolation from the crime’s situation or context, then context reinstatement is 
likely to be ineffective. 
 
Context utilisation difficulties in ASD: a problem with encoding or retrieval? 
Nevertheless, these context utilisation difficulties in ASD appear to be more of a 
retrieval rather than an encoding problem: individuals with ASD can remember the context in 
more supported conditions, for example they demonstrate intact recognition but diminished 
recall for incidentally encoded contextual details. Bowler et al (2008) reported that ASD 
participants failed to make use of context to aid their memory on tests of recall, but on 
recognition tests they utilised context words that were presented at study to enhance their 
memory performance to a similar degree as typical individuals. It seems, therefore, that 
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individuals with ASD will only make use of context if it is more explicitly presented to them at 
recall. Indeed, “…cognition in ASD is more rooted in the here-and-now rather than in 
information that has to be brought to mind in a way that is not immediately cued by the 
current situation…” (Bowler et al., 2008, p. 997). If utilising context is a retrieval rather than 
an encoding problem, then effective interview procedures might at least be possible to aid 
recall for individuals with ASD. It is possible that being physically back in the same context 
rather than solely trying to recreate the context mentally in the absence of any physical cues 
may enhance recall for individuals with ASD; a contention that fits well within a source 
support framework, where difficulties in remembering the source of information are largely 
eliminated in more supported retrieval conditions (see Bowler et al., 2004).  
Previous work has demonstrated that, in addition to the positive effects of mental 
context reinstatement procedures, typical individuals can also remember more if they return 
to the same room at test than if they recall in a different room (e.g. Davies & Milne, 1985; 
Fernandez & Alsono, 2001). In an early study by Smith (1979), for example, participants 
were asked to recall (without mental context reinstatement instructions) previously learned 
lists of words in either the same room in which they learnt them or in a different room. 
Participants who recalled the word lists in the same room recalled significantly more words 
than the group who recalled the lists in a different room from study. The purpose of the 
present study was to see if individuals with ASD might also benefit from physically returning 
to the same environmental context at recall. 
We presented participants with ASD and their typical counterparts with photographs 
of everyday scenes, rich in a variety of different but quantifiable details. One hour later each 
participant was interviewed for their memory for these photographs using the context 
reinstatement procedure followed by free-recall. However for half of participants this was 
carried out in a Different Room from which the photographs were initially viewed (in-line with 
Maras & Bowler, 2010), and for the other half of participants this was back in the Same 
Room where they had initially viewed the photographs. The aim of the present study was 
two-fold. First, to extend previous findings (Maras & Bowler, 2010) and confirm that context 
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reinstatement poses a problem for individuals with ASD. Our first prediction therefore is that 
when interviewed using a context reinstatement procedure in a Different Room, ASD 
witnesses would recall significantly fewer correct details and with lower accuracy than their 
typical counterparts. This would replicate some of the findings from Maras and Bowler 
(2010). Our second aim was to examine whether this problem with context reinstatement 
results from a failure to store context at all in relation to memories for the to-be-remembered 
event details, in which case physically returning to the Same Room in which the to-be 
remembered event was witnessed would make no difference to their recall, or whether it is 
more of a retrieval problem. If the latter is the case we would expect that context can in fact 
enhance recall if more context support is provided by carrying out testing in the room where 
the event was witnessed. To summarise, we predicted (1) less complete and less accurate 
recall by the ASD group when mental context reinstatement procedures were carried out in a 
Different Room from where the witnessed scenes were viewed, and (2) that when physically 
back in the Same Room, the ASD group’s recall would improve to levels comparable with 
those of the comparison group. Moreover, based on Maras and Bowler (2010) we also 
predicted equivalent rates of quantity and accuracy of recall for details pertaining to 
surroundings and objects in both groups, but that the ASD group would show less complete 
and less accurate recall for details pertaining to persons and actions in both test conditions. 
 
Method 
Participants  
Twenty eight individuals with ASD (23 males, 5 females) formally diagnosed by 
qualified clinicians took part. A review of available records and/or assessment with the 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord, Rutter, DiLavore & Risi, 1999) 
confirmed that they all met DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria for 
Autistic Disorder or Asperger’s Disorder. A comparison group of 28 typical individuals (15 
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males, 13 females)1 were recruited through local newspaper advertisements. No participants 
in either group were taking psychotropic medication, and none had any psychiatric or 
neurological disorder. ASD and comparison participants were matched on verbal IQ 
(Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Third UK Edition, Wechsler, 1997) and age. Fourteen 
participants from the ASD group and 14 comparison participants were randomly assigned to 
either the Same Room or Different Room conditions, provided that IQ scores and age were 
similarly distributed across the two conditions. A 2 x 2 (Group x Room) ANOVA found no 
significant main effects of Group (all Fs < .42, ps > .52), Room (all Fs < 1.21 ps > .28), or 
Group x Room interactions (all Fs < .38 ps > .54) for verbal IQ, performance IQ, full-scale IQ. 
There were also no main effects or interactions for age (all Fs < 1.35, ps > .25). Table 1 
summarises these data. Participants also completed the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ, 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 2001). None of the comparison 
participants exceeded the minimum cut off score for ASD of 32 (maximum = 23), and a 2 
(Group) x 2 (Room) ANOVA for AQ scores revealed no main effect of Room, F (1, 48) = .44, 
p= .51, r = .10, or Group x Room interaction, F (1, 48) = .29, p = .60, r = .08. There was 
however a main effect of Group, F (1, 48) = 165.52, p < .001, r = .88; as expected the ASD 
group scored significantly higher than the comparison group on this measure. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1]  
 
                                                          
1
 There was an unequal male-female ratio in each group, which was reflected by a significant 
association between participant group (ASD or comparison) and gender, ² (1) = 5.24, p<.05. 
However there were no differences between male and female comparison participants or between 
male and female ASD participants in terms of correct details, errors, or accuracy (all ts < 1.19, ps 
>.28). For this reason, combined with the lack of previous research to suggest that gender should 
influence recall by the conditions used in the present research, we included this unequal male-female 
participant ratio.  
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Materials  
The to-be-remembered stimuli consisted of four photographs of everyday scenes 
(titled ‘camping’, ‘shopping’, ‘dinner’, and ‘launderette’), each sourced via an internet search 
(see Appendix A for an example of one of the scenes). Scenes were selected that were 
different from one another but all rich in quantifiable details relating to Persons, Actions, 
Surroundings, and Objects. Scenes were presented via Microsoft Office PowerPoint on a 19” 
monitor at a rate of one per 20 seconds. Each scene was followed by a 5-second blank 
black slide and a 7-second instruction slide for the proceeding slide, which informed 
participants that they were about to see a photograph of an everyday scene and that their 
task was to describe everything that they could see in the scene in as much detail as 
possible, including what was happening. 
 
Procedure  
Participants were tested individually. The room in which the slides were presented 
was the same for all participants, and was chosen as it was notably different from the usual 
laboratory testing room (where interviews took place in the Different Room condition) in 
terms of location, size, layout and décor. The order in which the slides were presented was 
varied randomly for each participant. Following presentation of the slides participants 
completed unrelated filler tasks lasting around one hour in a different room (to avoid 
spontaneous context reinstatement). Both before and after the filler tasks participants were 
engaged in conversation by the researcher about events unrelated to the slides.  
Following this one-hour delay participants were interviewed about their memory for 
the slides in either the Same Room in which they watched them, or in a Different Room. 
Participants in the Same Room condition were seated in the same seat facing the same PC 
monitor as before (which was now switched off). All participants were interviewed for their 
memory of the slides using the context reinstatement procedure, which was followed by free-
recall. In order to follow best practice guidance, interviews followed the same structure (up 
until the questioning phase) outlined by the Achieving Best Evidence guidelines (UK Home 
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Office 2007), and Fisher and Geiselman (1992). This protocol included building rapport with 
the participant, explaining the aims of the interview, instructions to report everything (no 
matter how small or trivial it may seem) and to concentrate hard. Prior to interviews 
participants were informed that the purpose of the study was to investigate the use of part of 
a police interview that is frequently used to help witnesses to remember more, called context 
reinstatement, and the procedure was fully explained to them in lay language. Participants 
were told not to worry if they could not remember certain details and not to guess.  
The context reinstatement procedure took around 10 minutes and encouraged 
participants to focus on all aspects of their experience prior to and during encoding, including 
the internal (e.g. how the participant was feeling, what they were thinking) and external (e.g. 
what the environment around looked like) states, before attention was focussed on each 
slide in turn. This procedure began from ‘re-tracing their steps’ on their arrival to their journey 
into the room where they saw the slides, focussing on the room, where they were sitting, 
picturing the PC monitor in front of them, building up a clear mental picture of the first 
instruction slide and then that changing to the first photograph. Participants were instructed 
to focus hard and build up a clear mental picture of the photograph in question, noting every 
small detail, focusing on where the scene was taking place (i.e. where the photograph was 
taken), what the environment around looked like, what people were involved, what they were 
wearing, doing, how they were behaving, etc. Finally this was followed by free-recall for each 
slide. Participants were guided though mini context-reinstatements for each slide in the 
same order in which they were presented at study, following which they were asked to recall 
everything in as much detail as they could from that slide. Free-recall for each slide was 
uninterrupted by the interviewer until the participant had finished speaking and had indicated 
that was all they could recall for that slide. The interviewer then moved on to the next slide 
that was presented. The first author conducted all of the interviews, and had previously 
attended a police Cognitive Interview training course run by Surrey Police. Whilst the 
experimenter was not blind to the hypotheses of the study, the instructions and context 
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reinstatement protocol were standardised so that all participants received the same 
instructions and context reinstatement procedure in each condition.  
 
Coding and Scoring 
All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed, and details were scored against 
an original transcript for the slides using a technique developed by Memon, Wark, Bull and 
Koehnken (1997). Each slide was transcribed for each unit of detail that occurred to form the 
original transcript. Any details reported by participants that were not included in the original 
transcript but were confirmed as present in the slide were added to the original transcription 
of the slides to provide an exhaustive list of details. Each detail was further coded according 
to whether it related to a Person, Action, Surrounding, or Object. A second independent 
scorer blindly scored each detail in the final transcription according to which type of detail it 
was. Inter-rater reliability was good, Kappa = .89, p < .0001, 95% CI (0.85, 0.93). 
Each detail reported by the participant was coded against the original transcript of 
details from the respective slide as either correct if it was present in the photograph (e.g. “the 
man was sitting on the bench”), or incorrect if it was either inconsistent with the slide (e.g. 
“the man was sitting on the washing machine”) or not present in the slide at all (e.g. if in fact 
there was no man sitting down). One point was given for each new unit of information 
provided by participants, for example ‘‘one man (Person) is sitting (Action) on a bench 
(Object) reading aloud (Action) to another man (Person)” would be coded as five correct 
points: two Person correct, two Action correct, and one Object correct. Subjective 
statements of opinion (e.g. ‘‘he looked a bit shifty’’) were ignored. A second independent 
rater scored eight randomly selected interview transcripts (two in each group x condition) 
against the video clip transcription and the resulting Pearson’s correlations between the two 
raters were: rcorrect = .98, p < .0001, rincorrect = 0.85, p < .01. Accuracy scores were calculated 
by dividing the number of correct details by the total (i.e. correct + incorrect) details reported.  
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Results 
Overall recall 
Our first step was to examine overall recall using a multivariate ANOVA, with Group 
(ASD vs. Comparison) and Room (Same vs. Different) as the between participant fixed 
factors, and correct details, incorrect details, and overall accuracy as the dependent 
variables. The multivariate result was significant for Group, Pillai’s Trace = .14, F (3, 50) = 
2.75, p < .05, but not Room, Pillai’s Trace = .08, F (3, 50) = 1.42, p = .25, and was 
marginally significant for the Group x Room interaction, Pillai’s Trace = .12, F (3, 50) = 2.22, 
p = .09. Univariate tests revealed a main effect of Group for accuracy, F (1, 52) = 5.52, p < 
.05, r = .31. The ASD group were significantly less accurate (mean = .91, SD = .06) than the 
comparison group (mean = .95. SD = .04), although there were no main effects of Group for 
overall correct, F (1, 52) = 1.56, p = .22, r = .17, or incorrect details, F (1, 52) = 3.31, p = .08, 
r = .24. Although Table 2 suggests that the effect of the Same Room compared to the 
Different Room was more pronounced in the ASD group than the comparison group, these 
interactions were only marginally significant for accuracy, F (1, 52) = 3.32, p = .07, r = .25, 
and correct details, F (1, 52) = 3.36, p = .07, r = .25, and not significant for incorrect details, 
F (1, 52) = .12, p = .732, r = .05.  
 
Did being back in the same room facilitate recall for the ASD group? 
Although not justified by a significant interaction (p = .07), our a priori predictions that 
the ASD group would benefit more from recalling the photographs in the Same Room 
compared to in a Different Room, led to us carry out planned comparisons. We first 
examined differences between-participants. These revealed that whereas the ASD group 
recalled significantly fewer details than the comparison group in the Different Room 
condition, t (26) = 2.20, p < .05, r = .38, there was no difference between groups in the Same 
Room condition, t (26) = .41, p = .69, r = .08. A similar pattern emerged for accuracy, where 
the ASD group were significantly less accurate than the comparison group when interviewed 
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in a Different Room, t (18) = 2.50, p < .05, r = .43, but when interviewed in the Same Room 
there was no difference in accuracy between the two groups, t (26) = .48, p = .64, r = .09.  
Comparisons were also made within groups, and these showed that the ASD group 
reported significantly more correct details if they were interviewed in the Same rather than a 
Different Room, t (26) = 2.51, p < .05, r = .43, but there was no such increase in correct 
details between rooms for the comparison group, t (26) = .04, p = .97, r = .01. Table 2 
summarises these data. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
What types of details were reported, and did these differ between groups? 
In-line with previous work (Maras & Bowler, 2010), we next examined where these 
differences between groups and rooms lay in terms of the types of details that were 
reported. A 2 (Group) x 2 (Room) x 4 (Detail Type: Person, Action, Surrounding, Object) 
mixed ANOVA revealed a significant Group x Detail Type interaction for the number of 
correct details that were reported, F (3, 156) = 4.77, p < .01, r = .17, and Group x Detail 
Type interaction for accuracy scores, F (3, 156) = 2.92, p < .05, r = .14. No other Detail Type 
interactions were significant (all Fs < 1.74, ps > .16). Follow-up t-tests revealed that groups 
did not differ on the number of correct details, t (54) = .70, p = .49, r = .09, or their accuracy, 
t (54) = .86, p = .39, r = .12, for Surrounding details, or on the number of correct details, t 
(54) = .15, p = .88, r = .02, or accuracy, t (54) = .38, p = .71, r = .05, for Object details. 
However, the ASD group reported significantly fewer correct details, t (54) = 2.18, p < .05, r 
= .28 and had lower accuracy, t (54) = 2.58, p < .05, r = .33, for Person details, and reported 
fewer correct details, t (54) = 2.51, p < .05, r = .32, with lower accuracy, t (54) = 2.01, p < 
.05, r = .26, for Action details than the comparison group. Table 3 summarises these data. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
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Discussion  
In line with our predictions, when interviewed with a context reinstatement procedure 
in a Different Room from which they witnessed the to-be-remembered scenes, adults with 
ASD recalled significantly fewer details and were less accurate than their typical 
counterparts. When interviewed back in the Same Room however, the ASD group recalled 
as many correct details, and were just as accurate as the comparison group. These findings 
have important implications for police interviewing techniques. It appears that people with 
ASD are aided by context, but only when they return to the original location in which the 
stimuli were encoded do the Cognitive Interview techniques result in successful recall.  
Limitations on participant availability prevented the present study testing whether 
individuals with ASD benefit simply from physically returning to the encoding environment 
with no effect of verbal context instructions. Ideally this would be done by including a third 
group who are asked to recall the slides in a Same Room with no context reinstatement 
procedure. It is therefore difficult to ascertain from the present findings alone whether 
physically returning to the environmental context is effective because it provides scaffolding 
for the context reinstatement instructions, thus supporting the mental time travel that the 
Cognitive Interview encourages. Alternatively it is possible that this physical context 
reinstatement works independently of the mental context reinstatement mnemonic by 
encouraging spontaneous engagement in mental time travel without the need for any 
external context reinstatement instructions. We acknowledge that the lack of a third condition 
is a major limitation of the present study, and future work should explore whether physical 
context reinstatement without the mental instructions is similarly effective in enhancing recall 
for individuals with ASD.  
Nevertheless, since previous research (Maras & Bowler, 2010) which directly 
compared a context reinstatement condition with a recall without context reinstatement 
condition found that context reinstatement failed to increase the amount of correct details 
that were reported by the ASD group, it seems safe to assume that the traditional mental 
context reinstatement procedure alone is ineffective for individuals with ASD. This finding is 
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reinforced by the present study’s finding that the ASD group were significantly worse than 
the comparison group when interviewed with context reinstatement in a Different Room. 
Thus it seems that only when individuals with ASD have the support of returning to the 
physical context where the event or study material was learnt are they able, when 
encouraged, to engage successfully in mental time travel and thus recall details of the 
witnessed event accurately. Whether the mental context reinstatement instructions are 
important or not in combination with the physical context reinstatement remains to be seen, 
however, and caution is warranted in interpreting these findings until future work that 
includes a critical third condition without mental context reinstatement instructions has 
clarified this issue. 
In line with our predictions and with previous findings (Maras & Bowler, 2010), the 
ASD group recalled fewer correct details and were less accurate for details which pertained 
to Persons and Actions, whilst there were no such differences between groups for details 
which pertained to Surroundings or Objects. A lack of significant group x room x detail type 
interaction suggests that this more physical form of context reinstatement (i.e. in the Same 
Room condition) does not have a differential effect on improving the types of details that are 
reported by witnesses with ASD. Nevertheless, it would be worthwhile for future work to 
explore whether there are interviewing techniques that can specifically enhance the reporting 
of Person and Action details by witnesses ASD.  
Whilst at first glance the finding that the comparison group’s recall did not differ 
between Same and Different Room conditions is surprising, some previous work has also 
found a lack of physical context effect when combined with a mental context reinstatement 
procedure. Smith (1979) for example found that whilst memory for previously learnt lists was 
better when tested in the Same Room than Different Room, this difference was eliminated 
when in a second experiment an additional group of participants were tested in a different 
room and instructed to recall the original learning environment: their recall was enhanced to 
a similar level to that of the group who were tested in the same room. It seems then that 
context reinstatement was already effective for the comparison group to the point that being 
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back in the Same Room was superfluous. Context reinstatement did not aid the ASD group’s 
recall however, meaning that there was scope for improvement by physically being back in 
the Same Room.  
The limitations that apply to most laboratory eyewitness research also apply here. 
The static photographs used here are very different from real-life dynamic events and it is 
possible that they triggered more of an associative type of memory, as opposed to narrative 
memory which might be more common for eyewitness events. Since individuals with ASD 
tend to show intact associative memory (e.g. Minshew, Goldstein, Muenz, & Payton, 1992; 
Williams, Goldstein & Minshew, 2006), we cannot rule out this explanation. Future work 
should extend these findings using more dynamic stimuli to control for this possibility. It is 
also possible that context reinstatement is ineffective for individuals with ASD not because of 
the way in which their memories are stored with or without context, but because of the 
language requirements and online processing that the context reinstatement procedure 
demands, given that individuals with ASD have difficulties in both of these domains (e.g. 
Darmala, Keller, Kana, Cherkassky, Williams, et al., 2010; Gabig, 2008; Joseph, McGrath & 
Tager-Flusberg, 2005). Physically returning to the same environment allows the individual 
similar support as the traditional context reinstatement, but without the language and 
working memory demands. Future work is needed to clarify this issue. In addition, whilst the 
present findings may well prove useful if witnesses are able to re-visit the location of the 
witnessed event, there are obvious practical issues with this, and findings are limited to 
memory for single events in a unique setting. Cases of repeated offences, or those in the 
witness’s own home, are unlikely to be better recalled by revisiting the scene because of 
contamination with other unrelated memories. Finally, such real-life events are likely to be 
more arousing than static scenes. Since arousal can facilitate or impede memory 
performance (see, e.g. Christianson, 1992), caution is needed when generalising these 
findings. 
Nevertheless, the present study has important implications for helping individuals 
with ASD to recall more detail in investigative interviews. Whilst it will often not be possible to 
Context reinstatement in ASD 
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interview a witness in same place in which they witnessed an event, the present work 
suggests that there may be interviewing strategies, such as the use of photographs as 
context reinstatement aids, which might enhance recall in witnesses with ASD. Future work 
should explore such options.  
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Table 1. 
Age, IQ and AQ scores for the ASD and comparison groups (standard deviations in parentheses), and effect sizes for differences within each 
group and within each room condition 
 
ASD (N = 28) Comparison (N= 28) Between group 
difference effect size r 
Between room (within group) 
condition effect size r  
 
   ASD Comparison 
Same Room (N = 28) (n = 14) (n = 14)    
Age (years) 37.85 (11.07) 41.00 (12.75) .13 .18 .14 
Verbal IQ 112.23 (14.49) 109.14 (15.12) .10 .11 .06 
Performance IQ 109.38 (15.23) 105.79 (17.32) .11 .16 .14 
Full-scale IQ 112.15 (15.10) 108.29 (16.99) .12 .15 .03 
Autism Spectrum Quotient 37.62 (6.56) 13.54 (4.29) .91 
 
.12 .02 
Different Room (N = 26) (n = 14) (n = 14)    
Age (years) 41.77 (10.64) 44.29 (10.99) .12   
Verbal IQ 108.85 (15.23) 110.93 (16.75) .06   
Performance IQ 103.69 (19.64) 101.29 (15.46) .07   
Full-scale IQ 107.31 (17.46) 107.21(17.41) .00   
Autism Spectrum Quotient 41.38 (21.69) 13.31 (6.91) .66   
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Table 2.  
Mean number of correct and incorrect details, and accuracy scores for ASD and 
comparison groups within Same and Different Room conditions (standard deviations are in 
parentheses)  
 
 
Same Room Different Room  
Correct  Incorrect Accuracy Correct  Incorrect Accuracy 
 
ASD 
66.43b 
(21.55) 
5.79 
(3.85) 
.92  
(.03) 
46.86ab 
(19.69) 
5.93 
(4.48) 
.89a  
(.07) 
 
Comparison 
 
63.36 
(18.13) 
 
4.43 
(2.38) 
 
.93  
(.04) 
 
63.07a 
(19.25) 
 
3.93 
(2.67) 
 
.94a  
(.03) 
 
a
 significant between group difference p < .05 
b
 significant between room difference p < .05 
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Table 3.  
Mean accuracy scores and number of correct details reported by ASD and 
comparison groups for Person, Action, Surrounding and Object details (standard deviations 
are in parentheses) 
 
 
Correct details Accuracy   
Persona Actiona Surround Object  Persona Actiona Surround Object 
ASD 15.54 
(8.86) 
11.86 
(4.31) 
14.61 
(7.22) 
14.64 
(6.45) 
 .84 
(1.12) 
.91 
(.10) 
.95 
(.06) 
.94  
(.06) 
Comparison 20.21 
(7.13) 
14.75 
(4.30) 
13.36 
(6.13) 
14.89 
(6.05) 
 .91 
(.06) 
.95 
(.06) 
.97  
(.05) 
.94  
(.09) 
 
a
 significant between group difference p < .05 
 
 
